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Oxfam America is a global organization working to 
right the wrongs of poverty, hunger, and injustice. 
As one of 17 members of the international Oxfam 
confederation, we work with people in more than 
90 countries to create lasting solutions. Oxfam 
saves lives, develops long-term solutions to 
poverty, and campaigns for social change. To join 
our efforts or learn more, go to oxfamamerica.org.
Adeso is an African-founded and-led humanitarian 
and development organization that is changing 
the way people think about and deliver aid in 
Africa. We believe that development must come 
from within, not outside, African communities 
and that it is Africans themselves who must 
determine their own futures. We work to prevent, 
manage, and overcome situations that threaten 
the environmental, social, and financial well-being 
of African communities. With this approach, we 
believe that we can build on the foundations of  
our great continent and help take Africa forward.
The Inter-American Dialogue is the leading 
uS center for policy analysis, exchange, and 
communication on issues in Western hemisphere 
affairs. It seeks to build cooperation among 
nations and advance an agenda of democratic 
governance, social equity, and economic growth.
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CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CFT Combating the financing terrorism
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia
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Each year, Somali migrants around the world send 
approximately $1.3 billion to Somalia in an incredible 
expression of solidarity, faith, Patriotism, and generosity.  
Of that, approximately $215 million comes from Somali-
Americans and Somalis in the united States—comparable  
to the total amount of development and humanitarian 
assistance that the uS government sent to Somalia in fiscal 
year 2012 ($242 million). These flows, facilitated by Somali-
American money transfer operators (MTOs), represent a 
significant share of Somalia’s economy and help reduce 
Somalia’s reliance on assistance from foreign governments 
and international organizations. Moreover, remittances allow 
individuals and families to spend money based on their needs 
and priorities. Continued support from the Somali diaspora 
is essential for Somalia to successfully emerge from its 
protracted humanitarian emergency and political crisis, as  
well as to build the foundations for its long-term development. 
During the 2011 drought and food crisis in Somalia, the 
generosity of the Somali diaspora played a vital role in helping 
Somali families survive. unfortunately, when a bank in the 
united States closed the accounts of several Somali-American 
MTOs during the crisis, it became clear that money transfers 
could come to a halt at a moment’s notice. Somali-American 
MTOs constitute a critical link in the remittance chain, 
transferring funds from the diaspora and distributing cash to 
recipients throughout Somalia, where Western MTOs and banks 
have little or no presence. 
Somali-American MTOs need bank accounts in the united 
States to facilitate transfers, but have found it difficult to 
obtain them in recent years. They have invested significantly  
in compliance systems, policies, and training to ensure that 
they do not run afoul of uS anti-money laundering/combating 
the financing of terrorism (AMl/CFT) requirements, but most uS 
banks have ignored these investments. In recent years, many 
uS banks have branded Somalia a risky destination for money 
transfers and have unceremoniously closed the accounts of 
Somali-American MTOs without providing any specific reasons 
or justifications. Such closures have occurred at nearly twice 
the rate that uS banks closed latin American MTO accounts. 
Account closures have already endangered the lives and 
livelihoods of Somalis and undermined Somali diaspora 
communities’ confidence in the uS government and financial 
sector. Further closures could have disastrous consequences, 
up to and including a complete shutdown in the formal 
remittance system. 
Somalia’s recovery and stability are extraordinarily fragile. 
Many Somali families continue to rely on remittances to meet 
their most basic needs. With roughly a quarter-billion dollars of 
direct, community-level support at stake, all parties involved—
Somali authorities, the uS government, banks, and MTOs—must 
ensure that members of the Somali diaspora in the united 
States can send their money to Somalia as long as they are 
willing and able to do so.
executive summary
Rangeland rehabilitated under Adeso’s  
programs in Midigale, Somalia.  
Daniel Gerstle / ©Adeso
recommendAtions 
bAnKs should expAnd services  
to somAli-AmericAn mtos
Sending money to Somalia presents risks to banks, but these 
risks are neither unique nor insurmountable. Greater efforts  
by banks to evaluate Somali-American MTOs’ applications on  
a case-by-case basis will lead to crucial expansions in service 
for Somalis without a meaningful increase in the banks own 
reputational or legal exposure.
us policymAKers should prioritize 
remittAnce to somAliA
Even a partial MTO shutdown could threaten Somalia’s prog- 
ress toward peace, security, and sustainable development.  
uS Government officials should prioritize the secure transfer of 
funds to Somalia and develop contingency plans for shutdowns 
and reductions in service, bearing in mind that increases in aid 
are not an adequate substitute for the direct financial flows 
from diaspora communities that build resilience and address 
people’s needs and priorities directly.
the us treAsury depArtment should help  
integrAte somAli-AmericAn mtos into An  
AutomAted cleAringhouse (Ach)
The clearinghouses would aggregate all transactions originat-
ing from all MTOs and agents, thereby helping regulators and 
MTOs identify remitters sending funds through multiple MTOs 
to avoid scrutiny. It would minimize redundancies, enhance 
oversight of local agents, and improve compliance with uS 
sanctions regimes. 
mtos should improve trAining  
And monitoring of Agents
MTOs should continue to provide agents with diverse and  
appropriate methods of training to detect suspicious activi-
ties. MTOs should also regularly test their agents’ performance, 
keep documentation of all trainings and tests at their head-
quarters and regional offices, and carry out regular site visits.
mtos And regulAtors should  
collAborAte on best prActices
Although identifying a set of best practices would be useful for 
all MTOs, it is particularly needed by Somali-American com-
panies. In addition to promoting a set of uniform compliance 
policies and procedures, it would help rehabilitate the image 
of MTOs in the uS by directly addressing the fears and negative 
perceptions held by some banks.
mtos should develop mobile money  
trAnsfer technology for somAliA
Currently, at least three Somali mobile network  
providers have developed their own individual money transfer 
platforms within Somalia. Somalis are already using mobile 
technology to pay for goods and services. 
the us government should help  
somAliA regulAte its pAyment systems
Through technical assistance and capacity-building measures, 
the uS government can greatly help Somalia improve its pay-
ment system infrastructure.
somAli Authorities should Actively  
regulAte internAtionAl money trAnsfers
Passing regulations to prevent money laundering and the  
financing of terrorism would demonstrate Somalia’s willing-
ness to listen to the concerns of international partners, as  
well as build the confidence of banks. 
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introduction
This report investigates the obstacles facing the free and 
secure flow of remittance transfers from the United States 
to Somalia. Banks in the US perceive Somalia as a risky 
destination for money transfers, and, as such, have branded 
Somali-American money transfer operators (MTOs) as high-risk 
clients. We find that this blanket conclusion is not based on 
fair and individualized assessments of MTOs’ respective anti-
money laundering policies and procedures, and has served 
as the basis for unnecessary MTO account closures. These 
account closures may result in a substantial disruption to 
Somalia’s recovery and economic growth.  
Remittances to Somalia amount to approximately $1.3 billion 
a year, 16 percent of which comes from the United States. 
Remittances are a lifeline for many Somalis, providing them 
with a means to meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, 
clothing, and other basic necessities as well as open and 
sustain small businesses, send children to school, and invest 
in their communities. Remittances to women, in particular, 
result in investments in education, health, and nutrition.
In the United States, small and midsize Somali-American 
MTOs provide most remittance services to Somalia. These 
businesses offer basic cash-to-cash services at a relatively 
low cost. They specialize in personal, trust-based relationships 
with customers. Most of the MTOs have developed ways to 
deal with the unique challenges of sending money to Somalia, 
a country with security challenges, weak infrastructure, and 
minimal regulation.
Somali-American remittance companies face a challenging 
regulatory environment, particularly with respect to anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT) requirements. Somali-American MTOs actively seek 
to comply with US regulations and have made significant 
strides toward reducing risk through monitoring, record 
keeping, and agent training.  
Still, the Somalia remittance pipeline is under serious threat. 
Despite their efforts, Somali-American MTOs are often 
perceived as representing a high risk for illegal activities,  
such as the financing of groups and individuals listed by the  
US government as terrorists. Many banks have closed MTO  
accounts, making it difficult for MTOs to maintain operations, 
disrupting remittances from the US to Somalia, and, in 
particular, jeopardizing the survival of Somali families during 
the 2011 famine. Further bank account closures could result in 
a total remittance cutoff, which would endanger more Somali 
lives and interrupt economic development in the country as 
a whole. If all the stakeholders—the Somali authorities, the 
US government, US banks, and Somali-American MTOs—make 
a concerted effort, they can prevent these disruptions and 
greatly enhance the security of the remittance system. This 
report offers recommendations to achieve these goals. 
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A woman obtains cash through a money 
transfer operator in Badhan, Somalia. 
Daniel Gerstle / ©Adeso
methodology
This report is based on semistructured interviews conducted 
on behalf of Oxfam with individuals knowledgeable about 
the Somali remittance industry. These individuals included 
money transfer executives, midlevel managers, compliance 
officers, and agents, as well as customers, community 
leaders, professionals in the humanitarian field, religious 
leaders, Islamic law experts, US government regulators, 
elected representatives, and other businesspeople. Interviews 
were conducted in Minnesota, Ohio, the United Kingdom, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in person and by phone 
from February through April 2013. Some MTO interviews were 
conducted at the interviewee’s place of work, which allowed 
additional insights into standard operating procedures, 
compliance, and community relations. This report also draws 
on original research commissioned by Adeso, which consists 
of interviews in south-central Somalia, Puntland, Somaliland, 
Dubai, and Nairobi with executives and agents in the money 
transfer industry and consumers. Owing to the sensitive  
nature of the topic, interview sources remain anonymous.





Although Somalis have long engaged in labor migration, 
departures from the country accelerated greatly as a 
consequence of to the civil war in the late 1980s and early 
1990s that left nearly a million refugees in various countries 
around the world. The ongoing fighting in Somalia between  
rival factions has ensured high rates of migration over the  
past two decades. 
Currently, there are an estimated there are over 600,000 
Somali migrants worldwide, and possibly considerably 
more.1 This population has scattered across Europe and the 
United States as well as several African countries, including 
neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, which have sizable ethnic 
Somali populations of their own. Table 1 shows the estimates of 
migrants according to country of destination, as identified by 
the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation, 
and Poverty’s Global Migrant Origin Database (GMOD) and the 
World Bank.2 The figures in the table exclude Somalis in refugee 
camps. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports that there are 
more than one million refugees in neighboring countries.3
The United States is a major destination for Somali migrants, 
particularly resettling refugees. The US Census Bureau’s 
2011 American Community Survey reports that approximately 
127,000 people of Somali ancestry are living in the US, 91,000 
of whom are foreign-born.4
Somalis are concentrated in a few US states and cities. The 
2011 Census Bureau report indicates that approximately 38,000 
people of Somali ancestry live in Minnesota, with the majority in 
the Twin Cities metropolitan area, and significant numbers are 
in smaller Minnesotan cities such as Rochester and St. Cloud.5 
Somali populations can also be found in Ohio, Washington state,  
and California.6  
table 1. somali  
international migrants
country of destination gmod, 2007 wb, 2010
Ethiopia 223,233 161,179
United Kingdom 50,849 110,326
United States 43,529 109,618
Germany 25,091 11,144
Netherlands 24,978 13,521






Other destinations 145,000 255,627
total 619,008 813,273
Source: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty’s 
Global Migrant Origin Database (GMOD), 2007, and World Bank (WB) data, 2010.
remittances enable somali families  
to mitigate poverty and, in many cases,  
help them fulfill their immediate needs  
for food, shelter, clothing, and other  
basic necessities. 
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remittAnces to somAliA
Conflict, resource scarcity,7 and economic disruptions have 
made Somalia particularly reliant on remittances. Money from 
abroad can have positive impacts on entire communities. It 
is sometimes distributed to additional community members 
via loans and charity, according to several sources. In some 
cases, remittances support efforts at the municipal or regional 
levels, contributing to infrastructure projects such as the 
development of water-filtration systems, payment of teacher 
salaries, and construction of schools and hospitals.  
Moreover, remittances enable Somali families to mitigate 
poverty, and, in many cases, remittances help them fulfill 
their immediate needs for food, shelter, clothing, and 
other basic necessities. One customer explained that his 
monthly remittance of $400 to his mother- and sister-in-
law’s household supports food costs for six people who 
have no other source of income and pays for private-school 
education for three nieces and nephews, one of whom is 
about to start university and none of whom would be able 
to attend any school without financial help. In the absence 
of remittances, he says, he would be unable to “ensure a 
middle-class existence for [his] family in Somalia.” A recent 
study commissioned by the Food and Agriculture Organization’s 
(FAO’s) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia 
(FSNAU) found that one-third of remittance recipients in 
Somaliland and Puntland would be unable to afford food, 
medicine and school fees without their remittances.8 The same 
study found that households receiving remittances are more 
likely to support poorer families (75 percent) than households 
not receiving remittances (54 percent). 
In 2011, drought, conflict, and rising food prices led the UN to 
declare a famine in parts of southern and central Somalia. It 
affected millions and killed approximately 258,000, including 
 
table 2. characteristics of somali  
remittance recipients











USA 56,286 3,800 213,888,595
UK 48,616 3,342 162,458,204
Germany 23,989 4,383 105,137,834
Netherlands 23,881 3,513 83,903,243
Sweden 16,282 3,746 60,993,661
Canada 22,403 2,185 48,957,230
Denmark 12,824 3,569 45,768,062
Saudi Arabia 22,975 1,455 33,434,301
Norway 11,694 1,657 19,376,297
Italy 8,220 1,196 9,834,107
Australia 4,082 2,284 9,325,770
New Zealand 1,955 3,538 6,917,293
France 1,551 1,663 2,579,236
UAE 1,714 1,357 2,325,771
Spain 152 1,899 288,741
Other Countries9 351,297 1,400 491,815,842
Total Received 607,922 1,297,004,185
Sources: GMOD, 2007, for the number of migrant senders per country, and IFAD, 
Sending Money Home to Africa, 2009, for the amount sent per migrant. note: The 
number of migrant senders is based on an estimate that 80 percent of migrants 
send money.10
remittAnce estimAte method 1:





















80%                        varies (see Table 2)              varies (see Table 2)                    $1,297,004,185
figure 1. methods of estimating remittances to somalia
remittAnce estimAte method 2:
more than 133,000 Somalis under 5 years of age.11  Horrific 
as it was, the situation would have been much worse had 
the Somali diaspora been unable to send help. One Somali-
American described providing increased financial support not 
only for his immediately family in Somalia, but also for casual 
acquaintances who called to ask for food money.
It is difficult to accurately estimate the total amount of 
remittances to Somalia. Calculations range from $750 million to 
$1.6 billion annually,12 but it is difficult to find documentation 
to support such estimates. A World Bank study on Somalia 
estimated remittances of $1 billion in 2005. But the study also 
reported that the average remittance transaction was $200, 
implying that at least 500,000 money transfers to Somalia took 
place. This claim cannot be substantiated.13 
The flow of remittances can be calculated by examining several 
different sources: GMOD’s estimate of Somali migrants, a 2009 
survey of remittance recipients in Somalia carried out for the 
UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),14 
and data on average amounts of money sent as reported in 
interviews by MTOs. 
Using these sources, the total amount of remittances can 
be calculated in two ways, as shown in Figure 1. The first 
method is to multiply the number of people who claim that they 
received remittances by the annual average received.15 The 
second method is to multiply the number of migrant remitters 
by the annual average amount sent. Both methods yield a total 
of $1.3 billion per year in remittances.
Nearly 20 percent of remittance flows to Somalia come from 
the United States, which is the single largest source of these 
funds, as Table 2 shows. The countries listed in the table are 
those identified by remittance recipients in Somalia as the 
main places from which they receive money.
Without reliable data on Somalia’s economy, it is difficult to 
calculate remittances as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP), though it is undoubtedly substantial. Somaliland 
officials told Oxfam that remittances constitute 25-40 percent 
of its GDP, and the figure is likely to be similar in south-central 
Somalia. Regardless, Somalia receives more in an average year 
in remittances than it received in humanitarian assistance in 
• 51 percent are women;
• A large majority are employed, particu-
larly in such professions as teaching and 
entrepreneurship; 
• Remittances account for 60 percent of their 
average annual incomes of $3,000;
• Most have at least a high school education,  
and 25 percent of those recipients in their early 
40s have some college education; and 
• Most have relatives who left Somalia in the 
mid-1990s and who have been regularly sending 
money ever since.19
box 1. snapshot: somali  
remittance recipients
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remittanCes, gender, and develoPment 
in somalia
Worldwide, remittances typically have some impact on local 
development and the productive base of the local economy. 
These impacts are is mainly the result of asset building, and 
they are enhanced when women benefit from the flows.20 In 
general, studies have found that when women receive and 
control remittances, they are more likely to invest the funds in 
overall household well-being through increased expenditures 
on health, education, and nutrition.21
In Somalia, remittances are an important source of revenue for 
women. The IFAD survey found that more than half of Somali 
women receive money and are responsible for managing house-
2012 ($861 million), a year in which donors provided Somalia with 
an unusually high amount of money to aid recovery from the 
2011 drought.16 Humanitarian and development assistance from 
the US government to Somalia in Fiscal Year 2012 amounted to 
$242 million,17 just over the $215 million that we estimate Somali 
migrants in the US send annually in remittances.
CharaCteristiCs of  
remittanCe reCiPients 
According to the IFAD survey, 69 percent of respondents said 
that they had a relative abroad. Of those, 85 percent said that 
they received remittances, predominantly from Europe and 
the United States. Sixty-five percent of respondents reported 
having more than one relative abroad.18 
humanitarian and development assistance 
from the united states government to 
somalia in fiscal year 2012 amounted to  
$242 million, just over the $215 million  
that we estimate somali migrants in the  
us send annually in remittances. 
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table 3. characteristics of somali  
remittance recipients















Remittances as a 
share of income
59% 64% N/A







A woman buys household goods in  
Badhan, Somalia. Daniel Gerstle / ©Adeso
hold spending (even when they are not regarded as the head 
of household). On average, the income of Somali women who 
receive remittances is 52 percent higher than that of women 
who do not get funds from relatives living abroad.22  
Although remittances evidently improve the lives of Somali  
women and their families, it is important not to overstate this 
impact. As is the case in many other countries, Somali women 
receive slightly less (5 percent) than men in annual receipts 
(see Table 3). Also, they depend more on remittances than men: 
remittances account for 64 percent of their income, compared 
with 59 percent for men. Finally, female remittance recipients 
save less money than male remittance recipients.23 
Though Somali women must try to do more with less, there is 
no doubt that remittances help them achieve greater financial 
stability, particularly through increased savings. On average, 
female remittance recipients are nearly four times more likely 
to save than women who do not receive remittances. Moreover, 
female remittance recipients are able to save 70 percent more 
than female nonrecipients. Savings rates are is significant 
because remittances have a substantial positive impact  
on the ability of households to build assets through savings  
or investment.24 
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remitting from  
the us: marketplace 
challenges
remittAnces And the  
us mArKet
Approximately 20 money transfer operators (MTOs) send 
money between the US and Somalia. Most are small to 
midsized Somali-owned businesses that were established  
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, responding to the civil 
war in Somalia and the development of Somali refugee 
communities. Most Somali companies have a fairly limited 
US presence, with only 15-30 points of service clustered in 
areas with large Somali populations, such as Minneapolis, 
Columbus, Ohio, and Seattle. According to their agents, many 
of these companies also send money to several other East 
African countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and 
Sudan. However, nearly half of their transfers go to Somalia. 
Most companies also serve Somali communities in Canada, 
Western Europe, the Middle East, Australia, and major cities 
around the world with large Somali populations.
Contrary to the widespread impression that low-income 
countries such as Somalia have large informal money transfer 
and payment networks, the majority (73 percent) of remittance 
recipients obtain their money from established, formal MTOs. 
According to the IFAD survey, in 2009, 60 percent of recipi-
ents received remittances from the three largest companies 
operating in the region: Dahabshiil, Amal Express, and Qaran 
Express.26 It is estimated that 27 percent of transfers may be 
made through informal networks in Somalia, less than in many 
other African countries, where informality often exceeds 35 
percent. This percentage is at least partly because most of 
the MTOs are Somali companies that gradually expanded their 
services worldwide and have captured the Somali market 
for themselves, since the risks associated with operating in 
Somalia deterred other international money transfer companies 
from entering the market.
Figure 2 demonstrates how money gets from sender to  
recipient through an MTO.
remitting funds through a money 
transfer oPerator
1. The sender goes to the office of an agent of the remit-
tance company in the country where she or he resides, 
providing his or her full details (name and address) and 
a valid identity document. The sender then provides the 
cash she or he wants to remit, pays the commission, and  
provides information about the recipient.
2. The agent screens the names of the sender and the 
recipient through the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) 
List, the US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) roster of individuals and entities subject to 
counterterrorism and other sanctions; if the check returns 
no results, the transaction can proceed. 
3. The agent submits the transaction by updating the 
amount, the sender’s details, the recipient’s details, and 
instructions as to where to deliver the funds to a clearing-
house, usually at the MTO headquarters. Submission  
is generally done electronically.
4. The clearinghouse reviews and confirms that proper due 
diligence has been followed and, if satisfied, approves the 
transaction. The details immediately appear on an online 
database so that the sending agent, the headquarters, and 
the paying agent can all see the transaction. If the clearing-
house is not satisfied, it suspends the transaction and asks 
the sending agent to provide additional information.
5. The receiving agent then deposits the cash in a local bank 
account to be transferred to the company bank account.


























MTO - Money transfer operator
POS - Point of sale
AD - Agent distributor (on receiving side)
regulatory environment compliance monitoring
figure 2. the flow of remittances to somalia
6. The paying agent views the transaction information and no-
tifies the recipient either by telephone or by text message.
7. The recipient goes to the nearest branch, provides his or 
her details, proof of identity, and the name and the loca-
tion of the sender.
8. The paying agent confirms the details given against 
the transaction records in the database. If the details 
match and the receiver’s identity is confirmed, the agent 
generates a receipt from the system. Once the recipient 
signs the receipt, the agent pays the money and the 
system automatically informs the sender (usually by text 
message) that the money has been paid to the recipient. 
The transaction is completed. 
CharaCteristiCs of  
somali-ameriCan mtos
Most Somali-American MTOs are owned and operated by 
shareholders, with the exception of Dahabshiil, which is family-
owned. Management is usually highly centralized, and tends 
to be a modified form of franchising. MTOs operate through 
a network of agents present in major population centers 
around the world and throughout Somalia. These agents 
tend to fall into two groups. The first group of agents work 
exclusively for one MTO as salaried staff and/or receive some 
commission based on the volume of transactions they handle. 
The second group is composed of independent agents who 
have contractual relationships with one or more MTOs and who 
are responsible for their own operating costs. According to 
interviews with MTO agents and executives in Somalia, most 
agents work exclusively for one MTO.27 
Most Somali-American MTOs offer only cash-to-cash ser-
vices;28 only a handful of businesses have expanded into online 
services. Generally, Somali-American MTOs focus on building 
trust and relationships with their consumers for the purposes of 
their core business, money transfers, rather than attempting to 
offer a greater quantity of products and services. In interviews, 
both agents and customers both identified trust as the key to 
successful money transfer business in Somalia. According to 
an Imam, mutual trust is an essential component of Islamic law, 
and, by extension, of Islamic financial services.  
MTO executives also noted that Islamic law and reputational 
concerns require that MTOs avoid transacting with known 
criminals.29 As one agent in Somalia explained, “Our reputation 
is at the core of our business success; our ability to attract 
good employees and customers is dependent on our reputa-
tion remaining intact. Even if we do everything else right [but] 
through a single mistake allow a customer to undertake illegal 
transactions … through our branch, we will not only risk our 
lives but also our reputation could be irreparably damaged.”30 
The average cost of sending $200 to Somalia is $10 (most 
companies pay out in dollars because the extremely low value of 
the Somali shilling), meaning the average cost of sending money 
to Somalia is 5 percent, which falls below the 9 percent average 
cost of sending remittances globally, and substantially below 
the 12 percent average cost of remitting to Africa.31 
Table 4 provides information on some of the biggest Somali-
American MTOs. 
Somali-American remittance companies often also provide 
unofficial checking “accounts.” According to interviews with 
MTO staff, most of the large companies act as unofficial 
deposit agencies.32 This practice occurs primarily in Somalia, 
where there is no formal banking sector for individuals or 
businesses to rely on. However, it also occurs to a certain 
extent in the Somali diaspora. For example, some Somali 
migrants in the US debit their Dahabshiil “accounts” when 
they need to make payments, according to one source. This 
system has benefits and drawbacks for MTOs. They may be 
able to use the deposits as working capital, but it may also 
complicate their bookkeeping. The system offers customers 
a savings option more secure than “putting the money under 
the mattress,” but the funds are not insured. Lack of insurance 
the average cost of sending money to 
somalia is 5 percent, which falls below 
the 9 percent average cost of sending 
remittances globally, and substantially 
below the 12 percent average cost of 
remitting to africa. 
table 4. basic characteristics of somali-american mtos













Amaana Express www.amaanaexpress.com Dubai 1995 Cash to cash 5% $10 15
Amal Express www.amal-express.com Dubai 1997 Cash to cash 5% $10 30
Dahabshiil www.dahabshiil.com Dubai 1970 Cash to cash 5% $10 30
Hodan www.hodan-global.com Unknown 2001
Cash to cash, 
online
5% $10 15
Iftin www.iftinuk.com London 2006 Cash to cash 5% $10 5
Juba Express www.jubaexpress.com Hargeisa 2009 Cash to cash 5% $10 5
Kaah www.kaahexpress.com Dubai 2000 Cash to cash 5% $10 30
Mustaqbal www.mustaqbaluk.com London 1999 Cash to cash 5% $10 15
Tawakal Express www.tawakalexpress.com London 2003 Cash or check 5% $10 35
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leaves depositors vulnerable in the event that the MTO goes 
out of business, as Qaran Express, one of the bigger Somali-
American MTOs, did in 2012.33 
delivery Challenges 
Companies delivering money in Somalia, a country with poor 
infrastructure, face unique logistical challenges. For example, 
travel to rural areas can become impractical during the rainy 
season, when those roads that do exist can get washed away. 
Security is also a serious problem in a country experiencing 
ongoing conflict. One MTO executive explained that customers 
in Mogadishu have in the past been unable to move freely 
about the city, so his company had opened receiving points 
“on every block” to accommodate city residents. 
Despite these challenges, MTOs have developed effective 
means of delivering money. In addition to strong coverage 
of Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and other population centers, most 
MTOs have an excellent delivery system for rural recipients, 
often employing or contracting with agents in low-income and 
remote areas where the formal financial sector is completely 
absent.34 “We deliver to literally every corner of Somalia,” one 
agent claimed. 
Remittance delivery systems tend to be highly efficient 
because they are closely linked with business payment 
systems. In essence, Somali migrants send money home via 
clearinghouses in Dubai, which then deliver to locations in 
Somalia through an extensive network of local agents. At the 
same time, MTOs and their affiliate companies in Dubai play an 
important role as intermediaries for trading transactions  
(see Figure 3). The Dubai affiliates send products for sale 
in Somalia. The aggregate volume of remittances that MTOs 
pay out in Somalia is often equal to the volume of financial 
The term hawala, which comes from the Arabic word for 
“transfer,” is often used when referring to money ser-
vice busniesses (MSBs) in Somalia (xawilaad in Somali). 
The term, however, usually connotes a certain degree of 
informality, in large part because it is a system developed 
to facilitate trade between distant regions where conven-
tional banking institutions were either absent, weak, or 
unsafe. Hawalas predate traditional or Western banking 
systems, and in modern days operate in parallel to such 
systems. The traditional hawala in fact works by transfer-
ring money without actually moving it, often referred to as 
“money transfer without money movement.” Historically, 
such systems relied heavily on trust and honor, as op-
posed to any formal regulatory instruments, and debts 
between the sending and receiving agents were often 
settled through trade transactions. In Somalia, hawalas 
started operating as early as the 1970s, in response to 
the difficulties migrant workers faced when trying to send 
funds to relatives. While early hawalas operated infor-
mally, over time hawala companies have had to formalize 
their operations and processes in order to comply with 
regulations in host countries, including the United States. 
As such, today’s Somali hawalas have developed “strong 
anti-money laundering systems and transparency proce-
dures to adapt to regular inspections of their records to 
ensure that their systems are not being used to chan-
nel support to criminal elements or conflict actors.”37  As 
such, although MSBs in Somalia are often called hawalas, 
they are in fact not informal, and most are registered or 
licensed by the authorities in the countries in which they 
operate. 38
box 2. what is a hawala?
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transactions they send back to Dubai for businesses, making 
payments convenient for both parties. These are typical 
financial exchanges that many MTOs carry out with trading 
companies: they offer their cash payments for trading 
purposes. These cash flows to and from Dubai are usually very 
large. One MTO executive estimates that flows to or from larger 
towns could exceed $100,000 at a time.
monthly basis over many years. If the recipient is unknown and 
does not have identification, the agent will typically ask a local 
elder to vouch for the recipient’s identity.35  
The obligation of MTOs and agents to confirm that the 
legitimate beneficiary has retrieved the funds reassures the 
consumer that the transaction has been completed and the 
money has not fallen into the wrong hands. Agents rely on their 
social capital within their communities, their knowledge of 
local customers, and name-matching and pattern recognition 
techniques to ensure that money is reaching the intended 
recipients. Additionally, one customer pointed out that should 
his family members not receive their monthly remittance, they 
would immediately sound the alarm and notify the MTO. 
mtos in humanitarian resPonse 
At a global level, the past decade has seen a steady 
increase in the use of cash transfer programming as a way 
to deliver humanitarian and development assistance–either 
to meet immediate needs or address longer-term livelihood 
issues. Cash transfers are often used as an alternative or 
complement to in-kind support, such as distribution of food 
or essential commodities.  
Cash interventions were, for example, used at scale in response 
to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Since then, their effective-
ness as a resource-transfer option has been well documented 
in many contexts.36 In Somalia, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have been implementing cash interventions since at least 







figure 3. the two-way flow of  
remittances and business transactions
Another challenge associated with transfers is ensuring 
that the right person is receiving the money. Typically, the 
delivering agent will ask the recipient to show some form of 
identification and provide his or her name and the name and 
contact details of the sender. In rural areas, where people may 
not have government-issued identification, the deliverer relies 
on his or her knowledge of the community and customers. 
Agents sometimes deliver money to the same people on a 
In most parts of Somalia, mechanisms to deliver cash that are 
used by aid agencies implementing cash transfer programs 
in other contexts (such as direct distribution,bank accounts, 
smart cards, post office transfers, and payments through 
mobile phone networks) are not available or not practical due 
to security. As such, the main distribution method used by aid 
agencies in Somalia is the MSB, often locally known as hawala.
In a humanitarian context, and particularly given the complex 
nature of the situation in Somalia, the advantages of 
using MSBs are multiple. Among other things, MSBs enable 
safe, quick, and cost-effective disbursement of money to 
Adeso – African Development Solutions (formerly 
known as Horn Relief) has been working with MSBs in 
the direct implementation of humanitarian programs 
in Somalia since 2003, when the organization 
established the first large-scale cash program in 
the country, in the Sool Plateau area of Sool and 
Sanaag regions. Adeso used MSBs to distribute 
cash grants to allow close to 98,000 people to 
meet their basic food and nonfood needs in a 
time of crisis. Since then, Adeso has expanded its 
delivery of humanitarian programs in the region, 
and to date has been able to reach nearly one 
million people through cash transfer programs by 
making use of MSBs. During the 2011 drought and 
famine in the Horn of Africa, Adeso used MSBs to 
deliver much-needed emergency cash assistance 
to 20,887 households (or 146,209 people) in south-
central Somalia. The cash assistance helped save 
thousands of lives. This aid would not have been 
possible without the use of MSBs, as they are crucial 
for any Somalia-based cash program can operate. 
box 4. using mtos to deliver  
humanitarian assistance  
in somalia
Despite its weak infrastructure, Somalia utilizes 
mobile money transfer technologies that are 
unavailable in many industrialized countries. As in 
many African countries, Somalis treat their mobile 
accounts as money delivery systems, sending cash 
from one phone to another in seconds. People in 
remote areas with no access to banks credit their 
mobile accounts to keep their money secure, make 
everyday purchases such as food and fuel, and even 
pay school fees. While this system is not yet able 
to support international commercial remittances, it 
does provide a platform for innovative, cash-based 
humanitarian assistance programs.
In August 2012, Oxfam partnered with local 
organization HIJRA and Somali mobile phone company 
NationLink to bring relief to needy and displaced 
families in Mogadishu. Beneficiaries of past cash 
relief programs had to wait in long lines to receive 
money and then travel home through insecure 
neighborhoods, not to mention keep significant 
amounts of cash in their homes and on their persons. 
Using mobile technologies to conduct emergency 
cash relief eliminated these problems. HIJRA first 
conducted an assessment and identified 2,090 
households. Beneficiaries (most of them mothers) 
received a free mobile phone and were taught to use 
the E-Cash money transfer system. Oxfam and HIJRA 
then disbursed $150 directly into the mobile accounts 
of the beneficiaries. Many used the cash for food 
and livestock, or to meet family health needs; others 
used it to start or support small family businesses. 
After receiving overwhelmingly positive feedback 
from program participants, Oxfam has expanded the 
E-Cash program to more communities in Somalia.
box 3. mobile money transfer:  
using phones to deliver aid
beneficiaries in a project area. The MSBs are also able to 
distribute cash without exposing agency staff or community 
members to the many dangers associated with traveling long 
distances to distribute or collect money. The MSBs are also able 
to distribute cash at minimal risks, reducing risks both to agency 
staff and to community members who do not have to travel long 
distances to collect their cash. 
Aid agencies in Somalia would not be able to implement cash 
transfer programs, let alone pay staff members in the field, 
were it not for the MSBs. The entire humanitarian community 
in Somalia fully relies on the availability of MSBs to do 
business including transferring funds for project activities 
to organization staff or local partners and paying for staff 
and office running costs. Without MSBs, the United Nations 
and NGO community in Somalia would be forced to carry cash 
to pay day-to-day operational and program costs, placing 
funds and staff at risk in an insecure environment such as 
Somalia. Although remittances to Somalia represent a larger 
share of MSB transactions than international aid, cutbacks 
in remittances as a consequence of the global economic 
crisis combined with recurring droughts, conflict, and low 
agricultural production are likely to put increased demands on 
aid agencies to respond with interventions to fill gaps.39   
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When customers come to an MTO to make transactions, agents 
request valid, government-issued photo identification, such 
as a driver’s license, passport, or Permanent Resident Card 
(green card). They then enter the transactions in a computer 
program that screens the customer’s and recipient’s names 
and monitors for suspicious behavior. On average, customers 
send $200-300 per month. For larger transactions, companies 
ask the purpose of the remittance and the source of the funds 
(such as the name of the sender’s employer). The transfer 
company keeps a record of each transaction in its computer 
system for monitoring by the company compliance officer. All 
agents and MTOs interviewed retain these records for at least 
five years, with a majority keeping them for more than 10 years. 
All MTOs interviewed regularly screen customers against OFAC’s 
SDN List. The typical procedure is for agents to enter the 
customer’s and recipient’s names in their computer software 
to initiate the transaction. If there is any similarity to a match 
on the SDN List, the transaction is frozen and flagged to be 
reviewed by senior management. All MTOs reported frequent 
false positives, particularly for the most common names. 
In addition to screening against the SDN List, companies 
monitor customers for suspicious behavior. If a customer 
makes a fuss when asked to show identification, MTO 
employees flag the transaction. Similarly, customers making 
multiple, small transactions through agencies in the same 
area raise concern. Many of the MTOs surveyed have weekly 
internal compliance meetings in which management and 
compliance officers screen all regional transactions, discuss 
any issues or suspicious behaviors that agents have reported, 
and draft suspicious activity reports (SARs). MTOs carry out 
these procedures in both the US and Somalia; in areas with 
no internet connectivity in Somalia, agents delay delivery 
until their headquarters confirm that the recipient has been 
checked against the SDN List.45 
Like other MTOs operating in the US, Somali-American transfer 
companies face a challenging regulatory environment. They 
are subject to state, federal, and international regulations that 
seek to prevent money laundering and the financing of groups 
and persons designated by the US government as terrorists. 
Chief among the relevant laws is the 2001 USA Patriot Act, which 
criminalizes the financing of terrorism, requires additional 
customer identification procedures, mandates increased 
information-sharing between financial institutions and the 
US government, and raises the civil and criminal penalties for 
banks involved in channeling funds for either money laundering 
or terrorist financing.40 Further, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), which was developed by the G7 countries to combat the 
illegal use of the international financial system, has issued 40 
additional Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations.41  
Somali-American MTOs also face unique regulatory challenges 
stemming from sending money to Somalia. In addition to 
complying with US regulations, they must navigate difficult 
Somali payment systems. The Central Bank of Somalia resumed 
operations in 2011 after a hiatus of many years, but it remains 
extremely weak.42 In the future, the Central Bank plans to establish 
a licensing process for remittance payers, some of which may 
develop into full-fledged, certified commercial banks.43 
compliAnce with us lAw
Like most remittance agencies in the United States, Somali-
American MTOs seek to comply with US state and federal 
regulations, and they have taken significant strides in reducing 
risk.44 In interviews, company leaders, regional managers, and in-
dividual agents all expressed a strong commitment to compliance. 
“We work so hard to follow the rules,” one agent commented. 
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table 5. somali mtos and compliance with specific us regulations
Source: Authors’ interviews with CEOs, regional managers, agents and customers conducted in March 2013.
compliance areas
extent of 
compliance manner of compliance relevant federal law
AML/CFT policy 100% Companies create, maintain, and implement a policy
Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004
AML/CFT training for agents 100%
Companies train agents every six months on an  
ongoing basis
USA Patriot Act of 2001
Screening of customers 100%




Companies keep records of all transactions for an average of 
eight years
USA Patriot Act of 2001 (requires 
mechanism whereby records 
may be made available to US law 
enforcement officials)
Transaction monitoring 100% Companies monitor transactions electronically
Various AML/CFT laws  
and regulations
Inquire into large 
transactions
100%
Companies require customers to disclose the purpose and 
source of funds when they make large transactions. On 
average, the companies inquire into transactions larger  
than $1,975
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
(required maximum threshold  
is $3,000)
Designated compliance staff 100% Companies employ internal compliance officers USA Patriot ACT of 2001
A woman receives cash in Badhan, Somalia. 
Daniel Gerstle / ©Adeso
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Agents of the companies surveyed receive substantive training 
in AML/CFT, though some MTOs conduct these trainings 
frequently and some only at irregular intervals.46 The companies 
conduct their trainings on average every six months. One 
company flies agents in for a three-day compliance workshop 
every year. Another requires agents to go through a formal 
internal certification process, demonstrating their knowledge of 
all rules and regulations before they begin work. 
These trainings all demonstrate that Somali-American MTOs 
devote significant time and resources to compliance with 
US federal and state regulations. Table 5 illustrates the 
compliance practices of the major Somali-American MTOs. Yet 
the question remains as to whether there exist any truly fail-
safe methods that MTOs can adopt to prevent financial crimes. 
There have been multiple high-profile cases in which MTOs 
and banks failed to prevent money laundering or the financing 
of terrorism. The most important prevention tool so far is 
greater oversight of agents by company compliance officers 
and leadership, including training and auditing accompanied 
by ongoing improvement of the software platforms utilized 
to detect suspicious activity. As the cases in Box 5 suggest, 
several major MTOs and banks have not succeeded in 
establishing fail-safe transfer procedures. 
regulAtions And risK: 
Account closing experiences
Over the past 10 years, Somali-American MTOs in the United 
States have struggled to find banks willing to host their 
accounts. By the late 2000s, with most major banks unwilling to 
facilitate remittances to Somalia, most Somali-American MTOs 
had opened accounts with Sunrise Community Banks, a small 
financial institution based in Minneapolis. In December 2011, in 
the wake of two high-profile prosecutions of Somali-Americans 
in Minnesota, Sunrise decided to close Somali-American MTO 
accounts, leaving the MTOs scrambling to find alternatives. They 
have had minimal success. One MTO executive reported that only 
a single bank continued to work with the business. If this bank 
were to close its accounts, the MTO would “almost certainly be 
forced out of business.” Another MTO representative spoke of 
approaching a new bank about opening an account; bank staff 
refused to meet with him, and when he persisted, he was told 
that he was “wasting [his] time.” 
Bank liaBility
US legislation, including the Bank Secrecy Act and the USA 
Patriot Act, requires financial institutions in the US to assist 
federal government agencies in detecting and preventing 
money laundering and terrorism.49 If financial institutions 
fail to do so, the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and other regulatory agencies 
can impose multibillion-dollar monetary penalties and/or 
terminate the institutions’ operating licenses.50 Banks and 
other financial institutions are not legally responsible for 
their clients’ actions, per se, but they are responsible for 
exercing due diligence with regards to AML/CFT. Some banks, 
overwhelmed by the task, simply choose not to work with 
clients whom they perceive as risky. 
Banks alarmed By inCidents  
of material suPPort
In addition to feeling the weight of their responsibilities and 
liabilities, banks perceive a heightened risk in dealing with 
Somali-American money transfer businesses. In particular, 
hsbc And money lAundering 
In late 2012, London-based bank HSBC was ordered 
to pay almost $2 billion in fines for failing to stop 
criminals from using its banking systems to launder 
money. A Senate investigation found that it served 
as a “conduit for drug kingpins and rogue states,” 
allowing the transfer of billions of dollars to countries 
under international sanctions and individuals 
involved in criminal activities.47
western union And humAn smuggling 
Between 2003 and 2007, several Western Union 
agents in Arizona were found to have violated 
numerous AML compliance regulations by laundering 
money that eventually ended up in the hands of 
human smugglers. The company reached a $94 million 
settle with the four states affected and agred to 
improve its internal AML program and to cooperate 
with human smuggling and trafficking investigators in 
Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.48
box 5. recent scandals in  
the larger us market for  
money transfers
the somali-american mtos devote 
significant time and resources to 
compliance with us federal and  
state regulations.
20 keeping the lifeline open Remittances and markets in Somalia
they note several recent incidents isolated, but alarming 
nonetheless–of Somali-Americans providing material support 
to sanctioned organizations.51 
In 2001, federal investigators from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 
Treasury and State departments took action against Al-
Barakaat, a Somali-American MTO that they alleged to have 
channeled funds to an armed group in Somalia. After shutting 
down operations and seizing all funds, the federal agencies 
proceeded through a difficult and lengthy investigation. 
Ultimately, FBI agents reported that the available evidence left 
them with many suspicions, but no direct, unequivocal link.52
Throughout the 2000s, the US government has carried out 
occasional investigations of Somali-American remittance 
companies and agents. In 2008, four Somali-American men 
were arrested for channeling $8,000 to a sanctioned armed 
group in Somalia. One of the men, Issa Doreh, worked at 
a Somali-American MTO, Shiidal Express, in San Diego.53 
On February 22, 2013, a federal jury convicted these men 
of conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist 
organization. According to FBI Special Agent Daphne Hearn, 
“While the FBI is not concerned with the legal transfer of funds 
to family, friends, and charities overseas, when individuals 
provide material support to designated terrorists or terrorist 
organizations, the FBI and our Joint Terrorism Task Force 
partners will bring all resources to bear, to investigate these 
plots with a common goal of protecting all Americans from 
those who wish to do us harm.”55 
In April 2009, the FBI obtained warrants to search three MTOs 
in Minneapolis. The bureau reportedly spent five hours going 
over customer lists and transaction records. FBI agents did 
not specify what they were looking for, but some sources 
speculated that it was related to the recruitment of Somali-
American youth in the Twin Cities by Somali armed groups.56 
The MTOs cooperated fully, and the raids did not lead to any 
charges or arrests. However, MTO agents expressed concern 
that incidents such as these would ruin their reputation in the 
community, creating a false impression that they did support 
terrorist groups.57 
The Somali-American community has made it clear that the 
isolated incidents of a small number of Somali-Americans are 
not representative of the beliefs and values of the community 
In this difficult climate, it is important to highlight cases 
in which banks evaluate Somali MTOs on the basis of a 
fair assessment of their risk mitigation strategies. In April 
2013, several articles in the press reported discussions 
between Dahabshiil and U.S. Bank. According to a U.S. 
Bank spokesperson, “We are pleased that we may have 
recently found a solution with one remitter-Dahabshiil. 
Although it has taken us some time to get through 
this process given the complexity of the issues and 
regulations, we expedited our approval and monitoring to 
the full extent possible. We are currently in discussions 
with this remitter to ensure all parties understand the 
terms and requirements necessary to allow us to properly 
manage the relationship. Once this occurs, we will move 
forward to open the bank accounts in the near future.” 
According to the president of Dahabshiil US, “This is a 
very exciting day, not only for my business and me, but 
also for our entire community. … Somali Minnesotans 
and our families look forward to beginning to restore our 
lifeline.” Representative Keith Ellison, as well as Senators 
Al Franken and Amy Klobuchar, expressed their support for 
these recent developments.
The US Bank-Dahabshiil discussions constitute an 
important first step in ensuring a stable, regulated flow  
of remittances to Somalia. The fact that a major US bank 
has assessed the application of an individual MTO on 
the basis of the company’s record and current capacity 
suggests that, despite the challenges of sending 
remittances to Somalia, it is possible for MTOs to navigate 
these challenges in such a way that can mitigate risks and 
meet banks’ concerns. The discussions also create hope 
that other major banks will consider working with Somali 
MTOs. It is too soon to know, however, whether this will be 
a unique case or the start of a more favorable relationship 
between banks and Somali MTOs. 
The U.S. Bank-Dahabshiil discussions, though promising, 
do not mean that the broader issues surrounding bank 
account closures and remittances to Somalia have been 
resolved. This development constitutes only one major 
bank willing to work with one Somali MTO. Moreover, 
Dahabshiil is one of the largest and most established  
of the Somali MTOs. Many smaller MTOs, which perform  
a similarly important remittance service, still lack  
adequate financial services needed to maintain the 
flow of remittances.54 
box 6. An example of best practices
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as a whole. One Somali-American MTO customer emphasized: 
“We care about American security very much. We don’t want 
any funds to finance terrorism.” Nonetheless, the incidents 
have created a perception among banks and the general public 
that money transfers to Somalia are fraught with risk. 
aCCount Closures
As a consequence of this perception, many banks refuse 
to work with Somali-American MTOs. On average, the Somali 
MTOs interviewed have experienced 19 bank account closures 
since the early 2000s. Among MTOs, they are not alone in 
experiencing closures. However, interviews with five Latin 
American MTOs found that they experienced on average 10 
bank account closures during the same period. These figures 
would suggest that Somali-American MTOs may face more 
severe difficulties in finding banks willing to work with them.
Banks do not Provide reasons  
for Closing mto aCCounts
In closing the accounts of Somali-American MTOs, banks 
appear to be acting out of general aversion to risk rather 
than to any specific concerns regarding their compliance 
practices. Many MTOs were willing to share account closure 
notifications that they had received. The notifications were 
extremely general, typically mentioning bank policies against 
high-risk accounts. One MTO executive shared that none of 
the 40 account closure and rejection letters he had received 
mentioned any wrongdoing on the part of his company. 
Between ComPlianCe and risk: 
assessing the gaPs
This report finds that Somali-American MTOs generally comply 
with regulations and eagerly seek to minimize the risks 
associated with their business. However, it is clear that MTOs 
could improve their approach to risk management in three 
ways. First of all, because agents typically know customers very 
well, they may sometimes treat the checking of identification 
with a degree of informality. According to our interviews, 90 
percent of Somali-American MTOs have a policy of checking 
identification without exception, but the remaining 10 percent 
admit occasional lapses into informality with customers whom 
they know well, or with customers who come in to make very 
small transactions. Ensuring that 100 percent are asked for 
government-issued ID would greatly reassure banks.
Second, though most Somali-American MTOs have strong 
compliance on the outbound side of operations, they can 
further reduce risks on the inbound side by strengthening 
their relationships with agents in Somalia. Sometimes, 
disconnects can materialize between the US agents and their 
Somali counterparts. For example, one MTO admits having little 
knowledge about the agents working to deliver the money in 
Somalia. This disconnect clearly presents some risks. For the 
most part, however, MTOs disconnect have already adopted 
policies to improve payout security. One company, for example, 
has a compliance team travel to Somalia yearly to meet with 
Somali agents and conduct an internal audit of the company’s 
transactions. Many MTOs have formal procedures for selecting 
agents, including background checks and checks against  
the SDN List. 
Third, and largely beyond the MTOs’ control, the payment 
system in Somalia makes tracking funds very difficult. In other 
countries, MTOs typically regulate payments from the origin. On 
the payout side, central banks generally have policies requiring 
payers to document the legality of the transfer. Though 
regulators may audit payers only infrequently, they do monitor 
the process and perform surprise visits to make sure that 
everything is in order.
However, the federal government of Somalia currently does 
not regulate payment systems. In an interview, one US federal 
regulator mentioned that compliance issues lie not with 
Somali-American MTOs, who are “doing the best that they can,” 
but rather with oversight of payments in Somalia. Currently, the 
Central Bank of Somalia does not license payers or keep any 
official records of this sort. Thus, it is difficult for US federal 
regulators to trace money transferred to Somalia. In fact, they 
often are unable to trace money past MTO clearinghouses 
in Dubai or to ascertain its destination in parts of Somalia. 
This last and most serious gap can only be filled by creating 
secure mechanisms for payments in Somalia through gradual 
improvements in Somali government regulation, enforcement, 
and transparency. 
These areas of risk deserve greater attention on the part of MTOs 
and agents. However, US banks have responded in a manner 
disproportionate to the level of risk involved and have failed to 
distinguish among Somali-American MTOs, treating companies 
that are meticulous in their policies and practices in the same 
way that they treat those that take a less rigorous approach. 
us banks have responded in a manner 
disproportionate to the level of risk 
involved and have failed to distinguish 
among somali-american mtos. 
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impact of 
account closures
Account closures began to affect Somali-American MTOs as 
early as the 1990s and spiked in the years following the attacks 
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. MTOs operating 
in Minnesota seem to have felt the largest impact, although 
account closures have affected companies operating in other 
states as well. These closures have disrupted an economic 
lifeline to Somalia, hindered business growth, encouraged 
informality among remittance senders, and strained relations 
between the Somali-American community and US officials. 
disruption of income  
in somAliA
By far the most significant and direct impact of account  
closures was the interruption in money transfers to Somalia 
after Sunrise decided to close Somali-American MTO accounts 
at the end of 2011. Most companies interviewed reported delays 
ranging from several weeks to several months before they 
could locate a new bank and begin sending transfers again. One 
Minneapolis taxi driver described how, for over a month in early 
2012, he could not send money to his wife and children. Another 
customer described how a young man in his family dropped out 
of school when remittances were interrupted. “The blockade 
was difficult for every Somali family,” a community leader in the 
Minneapolis area declared. He recalled that Somali-American 
MTOs were “desperately” contacting banks and financial institu-
tions to find a way to keep remittances flowing. And he asserted 
that the Somali-American community’s main concern was the 
possibility that remittances would be permanently cut off. 
Overall, most MTOs said that the volume and amount of transac-
tions that they have processed have fallen since late 2011 as 
a consquence of interruptions in remittance flows, the rising 
cost of transfers, and an increase in informality–all directly or 
indirectly caused by account closures. 
Many Somali-American interviewees also expressed the desire 
to increase their investment in businesses and development 
within Somalia, but account closures have threatened to 
create a bottleneck of money transfers that delay and even 
discourage investment in the country.
Everyone interviewed for this study agreed that if account 
closures were to cut off remittances to Somalia, the impact 
would be devastating. In the words of one MTO manager, it 
would be “a huge humanitarian crisis.” At present, without 
concerted effort by MTOs, banks, and the US government,  
the risk of a remittance cutoff looms large. 
business performAnce 
The bank account closures have severely impacted Somali-
American MTOs, limiting their opportunities for further business 
expansion and development. Almost all MTOs had most–if not 
all–of their local bank accounts closed. As a result, they spent 
significant time and resources looking elsewhere–including 
out of state–to find banks that were willing to do business 
with them.58 On average, Somali-American MTOs currently have 
accounts in one to two banks. 
everyone interviewed for this study agreed 
that if account closures were to cut off 
remittances to somalia, the impact would 
be devastating. 
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Money to be distributed through Adeso’s  
cash relief program in Badhan, Somalia. 
 Daniel Gerstle / ©Adeso
Several companies indicated that they had initially anticipated 
expanding into states outside of Minnesota, including Ohio 
and Washington, to serve Ethiopian, Kenyan, and other East 
African communities. The bank account closures forced them 
to re-evaluate their plans for expansion and concentrate on 
responding to the immediate need to find a small number of 
banks to facilitate transfers to Somalia. 
The level of risk facing these companies has also increased. 
With a large amount of funds distributed across fewer 
banks, many MTOs have assets in bank accounts in excess 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) standard 
insurance amount of $250,000 per depositor, which exposes 
companies and their customers to risk. One company had more 
than $1 million in one bank account. Transferring these funds 
also presents risks; several MTOs have resorted to renting 
armored vehicles to transport cash from their main offices to 
banks in other states. 
increAsed costs
Account closures have greatly affected the companies’ 
operating costs and subsequent profit margins. The cost of 
hiring armored vehicles to transport cash to out-of-state 
banks is significant; one individual indicated that his company 
spends approximately $1,200 a month to transport money 
twice a week to banks in three different states. Additionally, 
smaller banks tend to charge more in various fees and are 
generally less efficient. One company indicated that one of 
its small banks charges 25 cents for every $100 deposited, 
substantially cutting into his business’s revenues. 
Following the 2011 Sunrise account closures, customers  
began sending money through more expensive and indirect 
corridors. One agent described how some of his customers  
had tried using Western Union to send money to Kenya, and 
then another MTO to transport the remittances into Somalia.  
A community leader recalled how some Somali-Americans  
sent money first to the Middle East and then had it transmitted 
from there to Somalia. This strategy essentially doubled their 
cost of remitting, as they had to pay two commissions on  
the transaction. 
on average, somali-american  
mtos currently have accounts in  
one to two banks. 
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Rising bank fees and added costs will most likely lead to higher 
prices for transferring money. Although most MTOs interviewed 
have tried to resist raising their rates, it is almost inevitable 
that these costs will eventually be passed down to their 
customers in the US and recipients in Somalia. 
informAlity
As Somali-Americans’ access to formal MTOs becomes 
increasingly restricted, the risk that they may turn to other, 
more informal mechanisms for transferring money increases. 
This shift already occurred in the immediate aftermath of 
the account closures; as MTOs scrambled to find other bank 
accounts, several agents and customers attested that many 
Somali-Americans sent money home via family or  
other travelers. 
With several recent, high-profile prosecutions of Somalis 
for providing material support to armed groups opposing the 
government, many in the community are concerned with how 
they and their homeland are being portrayed in the media and 
how they are perceived by those outside the community. In one 
interview, a Somali-American described wanting to explain to 
Americans that Somalia is more than just armed violence.
Bank account closures have exacerbated the situation, creat-
ing frustration with US officials among those in the Somali 
community. One individual described this as “creating a wedge 
between the US government and Somali-Americans” by  
fomenting feelings of distrust. 
The account closures have also created a wedge between 
the Somali community and several of the banking institutions. 
Many of those interviewed expressed frustration with the way 
that their companies–and by extension, their community–were 
treated. “It’s bias,” said one agent. Some noted that they 
understood why small banks chose not to withstand the regu-
latory scrutiny that comes with working with Somali-American 
MTOs, reserving their frustration for larger banks that would be 
well equipped to handle complex and challenging regulatory 
situations. “For them, it’s small potatoes, but for us, it’s how 
we feed our families,” one customer noted. 
Relations with certain banks further soured when they report-
edly closed the personal accounts of the owners and agents 
along with the business accounts. According to interviews, 
Somali-Americans who may have worked with an MTO in the 
past but currently do not were also blocked from opening 
personal accounts at these banks for the future. This policy 
even extended to individuals who had indirect relationships 
with MTO owners and agents; in one instance, a partner in an 
unrelated business venture had his account closed. In most 
cases, individuals received little to no explanation of the 
reason behind their personal account closures; letters from the 
bank simply stated that bank policy required it. These personal 
account closures contribute to the Somali-American commu-
nity’s sense that it is being singled out.
Banks appear to have a preconceived 
notion of the risk associated with somali 
mtos, regardless of company aml/Cft 
practices or leadership, based on the 
destination of the remittances. 
in addition, it would reduce the 
transparency of transactions and 
compromise the ability of the us 
government and somali authorities  
to monitor and regulate the transfer  
of funds. 
Remittances to Somalia will not stop with a complete shutdown of 
MTO bank accounts, even if many companies go out of business. 
In the event of further bank account closures, Somali-Americans 
will send money nearly exclusively through informal channels, 
which further increases the cost and risk of remitting. In addition, 
it reduces the transparency of transactions and compromises the 
ability of the US government and Somali authorities to monitor and 
regulate the transfer of funds.  
erosion of trust And  
community relAtions
Many MTOs, community organizations, and customers described 
feeling unfairly targeted because of their nationality. “This is 
discrimination,” one community leader said bluntly.  
“We thought that the US was a country that always welcomes 
immigrants,” one customer commented. Many of those inter-
viewed described two sources of friction: first, a sense of 
frustration with US financial regulators for failing to ensure a 
secure channel for remittances, and second, a sense of exclu-
sion from US banking institutions based on their nationality.  
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Notwithstanding these sentiments, we did not find evidence 
that banks or regulators singled out Somali-American MTOs  
because of a distrust of the Somali-American community. 
However, we did observe that banks appear to have a 
preconceived notion of the risk associated with Somali MTOs, 
regardless of company AML/CFT practices or leadership, based 
on the destination of the remittances. Even though we do not 
believe that banks are discriminating against Somali-Americans, 
it is no wonder that their unwillingness to even consider working 
with Somali-American MTOs fuels the widespread impression 
that they are singling out the Somali community.  
Although many in the Somali community are frustrated, they 
have not given up hope that the US government can help them. 
They described feeling supported by their elected officials, 
many of whom had spent significant time discussing the 
importance of money transfers with them and developing 
potential solutions. 
A woman receives cash relief from Adeso through a 
Money Transfer Operator in Badhan, Somalia. Daniel 
Gerstle / ©Adeso
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recommendations
Our main findings confirm the crucial role of Somali-American 
MTOs in Somali communities. It is essential for Somalia’s imme-
diate survival and long-term development that MTOs continue 
to operate in the US and that they freely and securely transfer 
money from Somali migrants to Somalia. With a concerted 
effort from all sides, it is possible to achieve this goal without 
compromising the US government’s security imperatives or 
banks’ business interests.  
bAnKs should expAnd service  
to somAli-AmericAn mtos
Banks should take the initiative to identify ways to safely 
facilitate money transfers for Somali-American communities. 
Sending money to Somalia presents risks to banks, but these 
risks are neither unique nor insurmountable. Somali-American 
MTOs are taking significant steps to ensure that their trans-
actions are safe and legal. Although banks enjoy freedom of 
contract to open accounts for clients of their choosing, their 
collective record of summary MTO account closures without 
explanation and refusal to consider the merits of MTO account 
applications suggest that their decisions are guided more by 
preconceived notions of risk than by actual risk. Greater efforts 
by banks to evaluate Somali-American MTOs applications on 
a case-by-case basis will lead to expansions in service for 
Somalis without a meaningful increase in the banks’ own repu-
tational or legal exposure.
us policymAKers should prioritize  
remittAnces to somAliA
Remittances to Somalia account for a significant percentage of 
Somalia’s GDP and play an integral role in its development. The 
international community has devoted a great deal of money 
and attention to enhancing security, building public institu-
tions, supporting economic development, and carrying out 
humanitarian response. Maintaining an open, secure channel 
for Somali migrants to invest in Somali communities and send 
money to their friends and families must rank as highly as any of 
these priorities. A remittance channel closure is among the most 
worrisome of the possible and foreseeable catastrophes that 
could befall Somalia in the future; even a partial shutdown could 
cause tremendous economic and social trauma, pushing money 
transfers toward informality and threatening the country’s prog-
ress toward peace, security, and sustainable development. 
US Treasury Department officials, particularly in the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), should build their under-
standing of Somali-American MTO compliance practices and 
encourage banks to open accounts for responsible companies. 
State Department officials and National Security staff covering 
Somalia should prioritize remittances and develop contingency 
plans for shutdowns and reductions in service, bearing in mind 
that increases in aid are not an adequate substitute for the sort 
of direct financial flows from diaspora communities that build 
resilience and track people’s needs and priorities directly.
the us treAsury depArtment should help  
integrAte somAli-AmericAn mtos into An  
AutomAted cleAringhouse (Ach)
Most Somali-American MTOs currently process transaction 
information through clearinghouses in Dubai before local agents 
are authorized to deliver funds. The money is then passed on to 
local agents, who are responsible for ensuring that the funds 
are delivered or transferred to the intended recipient. The US 
Treasury Department can bolster the security of the remittance 
system by facilitating the creation of a shared clearinghouse 
based in the US; many MTOs expressed support for such a move. 
The clearinghouse would aggregate all transactions originating 
from all MTOs and agents, thereby helping regulators and MTOs 
identify remitters sending funds through multiple MTOs to avoid 
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scrutiny. It would minimize redundancies, enhance oversight 
of local agents, and improve compliance with US sanctions 
regimes. The clearinghouse should be jointly financed by the 
Treasury Department, banks, and MTOs.
mtos should improve trAining  
And monitoring of Agents
Agents in both the origin and the destination country of the 
remittance are key conduits in the transfer of money. They are 
best positioned to identify and prevent potential violations of 
US law during money transfers. Therefore, MTOs should con-
tinue to provide agents with diverse and appropriate methods 
of training to detect suspicious activities. MTOs should also 
regularly test their agents’ performance, keep documentation 
of all trainings and tests at their headquarters and regional 
offices, and carry out regular site visits and performance tests. 
In particular, MTOs must take steps to improve communications 
with and oversight by Somali agents and contractors to ensure 
secure remittance deliveries. 
mtos And regulAtors should  
collAborAte on best prActices
US state and federal regulators should cooperate with the 
money transfer industry to create a series of standards for  
responsible money transfer operations. Although this frame-
work would be useful for all MTOs, it is particularly needed by 
Somali-American companies. In addition to promoting a set 
of uniform compliance policies and procedures, it would help 
rehabilitate the image of MTOs in the US by directly addressing 
the fears and negative perceptions held by some banks.
Industry best practices would specify appropriate standards 
for training, licensing, and formal auditing. They would also 
include specific guidelines for monitoring MTO agents within 
Somalia, in order to establish a certification and licensing 
system. Some Somali-American MTOs have already taken these 
steps, but they have failed to change the perception of US 
banks and regulators.
mtos should develop mobile money  
trAnsfer technology for somAliA
Telecommunications is a fast-growing sector in Somalia. At 
 least three Somali mobile network providers have developed 
money transfer platforms. Somalis are already using mobile 
technology to pay for goods and services. Aid agencies have 
found mobile money transfer to be an attractive option due to 
reduced leakage, improved reconciliation and control of expen-
diture, greater speed and efficiency of transfers, and reduced 
costs.59 Mobile money delivery also offers the opportunity for 
real-time tracking of payments. 
Many MTOs expressed a desire to utilize this technology to 
facilitate international money transfers through a platform like 
M-Pesa in Kenya. In order to do so, they will have to navigate 
federal and state regulations in the US, coordinate with Somali 
authorities, and encourage cooperation between multiple pri-
vate sector interests. Somalia is a viable market for international 
mobile money transfers.  
the us government should help somAliA  
regulAte its pAyment systems
Through technical assistance and capacity building, the US 
government can greatly help Somalia improve its payment 
system infrastructure. For example, the US government could 
help the Somali Central Bank monitor compliance could assist 
with the drafting and enactment of licensing requirements, 
and could facilitate the development of benchmarks for money 
laundering prevention.
somAli Authorities should Actively  
regulAte internAtionAl money trAnsfers
In order to build confidence and encourage US Treasury 
Department support, Somali authorities and the Somali Central 
Bank should demonstrate their serious commitment to AML/CFT 
by passing regulations and actively responding to the concerns 
expressed by international partners. 
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Appendix 1 
Account closure letter from A 
smAll bAnK to A somAli-AmericAn mto
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Appendix 2 
Account ApplicAtion deniAl letter  














































































































































































*No exact boundary between 
Somaliland and Puntland on the 
disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag
*No exact boundary between 
North and South Mudug
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